India-UK Extradition: The Sanjay Bhandari factor
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| Pic: David Castor |
In February 2025, came the judgment in the Sanjay Bhandari extradition case. It was given by the Vice-President of the Court of Appeal (criminal division), Lord Justice Holroyde, and Mrs Justice Steyn. The sum effect of that judgment is that Bhandari is a free man. Every defendant is entitled to legal recourse, and in Bhandari's case it was Edward Fitzgerald, KC instructed by Janes Solicitors who represented him.
It is now very evident that para 134 of the judgment has now come to occupy a very key argument in India-UK extradition cases. It reads:
The evidence is that the use of proscribed treatment to obtain confessions is commonplace and endemic. The evidence indicates that the focus on obtaining confessions flows from being under-resourced, lacking modern investigation techniques or sufficient personnel; and from the lack of will to stamp out the use of torture, reflected in the failure to ratify UNCAT. Those factors would be unaffected by whether investigating bodies have the opportunity to question the appellant in their own detention facilities or can only do so at Tihar prison. In addition, there is some (albeit more limited) evidence of the use of violence by investigation officers, against those under investigation, to extort money. The latter motive would be unaffected by the location of questioning, and the appellant is likely to be at increased risk of extortion because he is, or would be perceived to be, a wealthy man.
The Bhandari judgment came under the full glare in the Nirav Modi extradition case but a much lesser known case of extradition appeal also came to aid in at a permission to appeal stage.
Jaysukh Ranpariya extradition case
Jaysukh Ranpariya extradition case
This case concerns the requested person Jaysukh Ranpariya also known as Jayesh Patel. The Westminster Magistrates' Court gave a humungous judgment running into 836 paragraphs over 296 pages on 30 March 2023. Ranpariya approached the high court to appeal the judgment and has been successful.
On 23 March, 2026 the High Court has partially granted permission to appeal in an extradition case involving Ranpariya, who is sought by India to face serious criminal charges including murder and conspiracy to murder. The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice Sheldon, considers whether the applicant should be allowed to challenge an earlier decision ordering his extradition.
The case arises from a lengthy ruling by a District Judge, who after a 19-day hearing concluded that extradition was lawful, compatible with the applicant’s human rights, and not barred under the Extradition Act 2003. That decision was upheld administratively when the Home Secretary ordered extradition in 2023. A previous attempt to appeal had already been refused on the papers, meaning this was a renewed application for permission.
The High Court’s task at this stage was not to decide the merits of the extradition itself, but whether any of the applicant’s arguments were “arguable” enough to justify a full appeal. The legal test is strict: the court must be satisfied that the lower court may have been “wrong” in a way that could have changed the outcome.
Seven grounds of appeal were advanced. These included challenges to the adequacy of the evidence, the classification of the alleged offences, and several human rights arguments under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment.
On the first two grounds—whether the allegations were sufficiently detailed and whether they constituted extradition offences—the High Court found there was an arguable case, at least in relation to one of the allegations involving a shooting in 2019. The judge noted inconsistencies in the way the conduct was described: at times it appeared to be an attempt to intimidate the victim, while elsewhere it was framed as an instruction to kill. This lack of clarity raised a legitimate question about whether the legal requirements for extradition had been properly satisfied.
The third ground, concerning whether there was a “prima facie case” (that is, sufficient evidence to justify a trial), was also found to be arguable. The applicant had criticised the way the District Judge assessed the evidence, including reliance on statements from co-accused individuals. The High Court accepted that these issues deserved further scrutiny, particularly given concerns about the reliability of such evidence and the circumstances in which it was obtained.
A central part of the case concerned the risk of ill-treatment if the applicant were returned to India. On this issue, the High Court allowed part of the appeal to proceed. It held that there was an arguable question about whether the District Judge had properly assessed the risk of torture, especially in light of more recent case law suggesting that coercive interrogation practices in India may be widespread.
However, the court firmly rejected one aspect of this argument. The applicant had claimed he had previously been tortured in India, and that this increased the risk of future mistreatment. The District Judge had found these allegations not credible, citing inconsistencies in his accounts, lack of medical evidence, and failure to raise complaints at the time. The High Court upheld this finding, emphasising that appellate courts should be slow to overturn factual conclusions based on detailed evidence and witness assessment.
The judgment contains an extensive discussion of the District Judge’s reasoning on this point. She had carefully analysed medical records, court documents, and expert evidence, concluding that while the applicant may have been subjected to degrading treatment—such as being publicly “paraded” by police—there was insufficient evidence of torture. The High Court found no arguable error in that conclusion.
In contrast, the applicant’s remaining arguments were rejected outright. These included claims about prison conditions, inadequate medical care, the risk of suicide, and the possibility of being sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. On each of these issues, the High Court found that the District Judge had applied the correct legal tests and reached conclusions that were open to her on the evidence.
Particular weight was given to assurances provided by the Indian government. These included prison conditions, medical care, and the possibility of sentence remission. The District Judge had found these assurances to be detailed, specific, and given in good faith. The High Court agreed, noting that such assurances are a recognised and important feature of extradition law.
In relation to the risk of suicide, the court accepted that the applicant was vulnerable but concluded that this risk could be managed with appropriate safeguards. Similarly, concerns about a life sentence without parole were dismissed as speculative, given the assurances that the applicant would be eligible for release mechanisms under Indian law.
On 23 March, 2026 the High Court has partially granted permission to appeal in an extradition case involving Ranpariya, who is sought by India to face serious criminal charges including murder and conspiracy to murder. The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice Sheldon, considers whether the applicant should be allowed to challenge an earlier decision ordering his extradition.
The case arises from a lengthy ruling by a District Judge, who after a 19-day hearing concluded that extradition was lawful, compatible with the applicant’s human rights, and not barred under the Extradition Act 2003. That decision was upheld administratively when the Home Secretary ordered extradition in 2023. A previous attempt to appeal had already been refused on the papers, meaning this was a renewed application for permission.
The High Court’s task at this stage was not to decide the merits of the extradition itself, but whether any of the applicant’s arguments were “arguable” enough to justify a full appeal. The legal test is strict: the court must be satisfied that the lower court may have been “wrong” in a way that could have changed the outcome.
Seven grounds of appeal were advanced. These included challenges to the adequacy of the evidence, the classification of the alleged offences, and several human rights arguments under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment.
On the first two grounds—whether the allegations were sufficiently detailed and whether they constituted extradition offences—the High Court found there was an arguable case, at least in relation to one of the allegations involving a shooting in 2019. The judge noted inconsistencies in the way the conduct was described: at times it appeared to be an attempt to intimidate the victim, while elsewhere it was framed as an instruction to kill. This lack of clarity raised a legitimate question about whether the legal requirements for extradition had been properly satisfied.
The third ground, concerning whether there was a “prima facie case” (that is, sufficient evidence to justify a trial), was also found to be arguable. The applicant had criticised the way the District Judge assessed the evidence, including reliance on statements from co-accused individuals. The High Court accepted that these issues deserved further scrutiny, particularly given concerns about the reliability of such evidence and the circumstances in which it was obtained.
A central part of the case concerned the risk of ill-treatment if the applicant were returned to India. On this issue, the High Court allowed part of the appeal to proceed. It held that there was an arguable question about whether the District Judge had properly assessed the risk of torture, especially in light of more recent case law suggesting that coercive interrogation practices in India may be widespread.
However, the court firmly rejected one aspect of this argument. The applicant had claimed he had previously been tortured in India, and that this increased the risk of future mistreatment. The District Judge had found these allegations not credible, citing inconsistencies in his accounts, lack of medical evidence, and failure to raise complaints at the time. The High Court upheld this finding, emphasising that appellate courts should be slow to overturn factual conclusions based on detailed evidence and witness assessment.
The judgment contains an extensive discussion of the District Judge’s reasoning on this point. She had carefully analysed medical records, court documents, and expert evidence, concluding that while the applicant may have been subjected to degrading treatment—such as being publicly “paraded” by police—there was insufficient evidence of torture. The High Court found no arguable error in that conclusion.
In contrast, the applicant’s remaining arguments were rejected outright. These included claims about prison conditions, inadequate medical care, the risk of suicide, and the possibility of being sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. On each of these issues, the High Court found that the District Judge had applied the correct legal tests and reached conclusions that were open to her on the evidence.
Particular weight was given to assurances provided by the Indian government. These included prison conditions, medical care, and the possibility of sentence remission. The District Judge had found these assurances to be detailed, specific, and given in good faith. The High Court agreed, noting that such assurances are a recognised and important feature of extradition law.
In relation to the risk of suicide, the court accepted that the applicant was vulnerable but concluded that this risk could be managed with appropriate safeguards. Similarly, concerns about a life sentence without parole were dismissed as speculative, given the assurances that the applicant would be eligible for release mechanisms under Indian law.
In conclusion, the High Court granted permission to appeal on limited grounds—relating to the clarity of the allegations, the sufficiency of evidence, and aspects of the torture risk assessment—but refused permission on all other issues. The case will now proceed to a substantive appeal hearing on those specific points, marking the next stage in what has already been a complex and closely scrutinised extradition process.
The Bhandari factor
The earlier decision in Bhandari v India played a limited but important role in the High Court’s reasoning in Ranpariya—particularly on the issue of risk of torture under Article 3.
The main impact of Bhandari was to reinforce that concerns about police mistreatment in India are judicially recognised and not merely speculative. In Bhandari, the Divisional Court found evidence suggesting that the use of coercive interrogation techniques could be “commonplace and endemic” in certain contexts.
In Ranpariya, Mr Justice Sheldon expressly relied on this development to conclude that Ground 5 (risk of torture) was arguable. This meant the applicant had crossed the relatively low threshold needed to proceed to a full appeal hearing on that issue.
However, the court was equally clear that Bhandari did not automatically undermine extradition to India. It rejected any suggestion that the case created a general presumption against extradition.
A crucial limitation was that Bhandari did not assist Ranpariya in challenging the factual finding that he had not previously been tortured.
In Bhandari, concerns were raised about whether assurances could sufficiently mitigate risk. In Ranpariya, this issue remains live.
The Bhandari factor
The earlier decision in Bhandari v India played a limited but important role in the High Court’s reasoning in Ranpariya—particularly on the issue of risk of torture under Article 3.
The main impact of Bhandari was to reinforce that concerns about police mistreatment in India are judicially recognised and not merely speculative. In Bhandari, the Divisional Court found evidence suggesting that the use of coercive interrogation techniques could be “commonplace and endemic” in certain contexts.
In Ranpariya, Mr Justice Sheldon expressly relied on this development to conclude that Ground 5 (risk of torture) was arguable. This meant the applicant had crossed the relatively low threshold needed to proceed to a full appeal hearing on that issue.
However, the court was equally clear that Bhandari did not automatically undermine extradition to India. It rejected any suggestion that the case created a general presumption against extradition.
A crucial limitation was that Bhandari did not assist Ranpariya in challenging the factual finding that he had not previously been tortured.
In Bhandari, concerns were raised about whether assurances could sufficiently mitigate risk. In Ranpariya, this issue remains live.
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